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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
[T]he principle which regulates the existing
social relations between the two sexes — the
legal subordination of one sex to the other —
is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief
hindrances to human improvement; and . . .
ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect
equality, admitting no power or privilege on
one side, nor disability on the other.
1
When John Stuart Mill wrote those words more than a century ago,
he spoke from "the experience of life." Observing the conditions
under which women of his day functioned — "the very being or legal
existence of the woman [was] suspended during marriage," 2 women were
generally and systematically excluded from educational and professional
opportunities — Mill argued for legal equality as an essential first
step toward social equality. He saw what few of his contemporaries
did, that the slavelike conditions of most women's lives should be
changed, and that the appropriate changes could not come about until
women were granted full equality under the law: legally bar-red from
any but the most menial employment, women lacked the means to support
themselves, were forced into marriage and out of legal existence, a
brutal, self-perpetuating cycle.
1
My purpose here is first to document the recent pursuit by
American women of Mill's "principle of perfect equality." I will
confine my inquiry to opinions of the United States Supreme Court, to
which body we have logically looked for articulation of that principle.
I say "logically" because the Court, in recent decades, has shown
itself capable — through novel construction of constitutional text —
of vigorous protection of equal rights for racial minorities.
As the Court has abandoned the presumption of constitutionality of
legislative exercises of the broad police power where fundamental
individual rights aire at issue, so has it infused the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment3 with power to shield from legislative classifications.
In the process of constitutional adjudication, the Court has departed
from its traditional "rational relationship" equal protection analysis
to require that legislation classifying according to race be essential
to attainment of a "compelling public interest." The result of this
presumption of invalidity is a nearly absolute prohibition against
racial classifications. It was thus not unreasonable to see in the
concept of "equal protection" the promise of gender equality.
That the premise of equality of the sexes has not been fulfilled
will be fairly readily demonstrated. The more difficult tasks will be
to determine where we are, in constitutional terms, in our: quest for
equality, and why .
Those inquiries require scrupulous analysis of the Court's
opinions in cases questioning the constitutionality of gender-
classifications in a variety of contexts and for a variety of
discernible purposes. Because the body of law is relatively new and is
yet "unsettled" on the question of the constitutionality of gender
classifications, I will often be no less interested in the rationales
offered — sometimes numerous in a given case, for a given result —
than in the results themselves.
I have chosen, for purposes of illumination, to treat the gender-
cases in three groups. I will first examine the legacy of legal
paternalism as voiced in opinions delivered between 1873 and 1961, for
if those cases are no longer good law, neither are they merely a
backdrop: the attitudes toward women expressed there inform — and are
at times still embraced by — individual justices, legislators at state
and national levels, and members of the electorate as well.
Next, I will analyze a group of cases decided between 1971, when
the Court first invalidated a statutory gender distinction on equal
protection grounds, and 1976, when Craig v. Boren4 announced an
intermediate level of equal protection analysis peculiar- to gender
cases and prevailing today. I have chosen to treat those cases as a
discrete body of law for two reasons: First, these are the
controversies, arising during a period of feminist activism and
coincident with Congress 1 passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, 5 in
which the Court was asked, explicitly and repeatedly, to afford the
same constitutional protection from gender classification as had been
provided against racial classification.
Second, the years 1971-75 constitute something like "the formative
years" in the Court's struggle to decide upon an appropriate
constitutional standard in gender cases. Those year's and those cases,
then, embody a significant portion of our constitutional history and
are thus worthy of special attention.
The third group of cases commences with the Craig decision in
1976, when the struggle with constitutional standards in gender cases
may have appeared to have ended. As my analysis of Craig and
subsequent cases will illustrate, the Court's confusion did not end
there: its consistent (by which I mean only "regular") invocation of
the standard established in Craig has not produced a consistent body of
law.
Before I turn to examination of the gender cases, however, I must
first briefly remind the reader of the Court's fashioning, from the
language of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments, a remarkable
constitutional protection from discrimination on account of race.
Appreciation of the Court's dynamic role in protecting individuals from
racial classification is essential to understanding of its treatment of
classifications based on sex. Chapters III and IV will describe what
the Court has done in cases challenging the constitutionality of gender
classifications; Chapter II will suggest what it might have done.
CHAPTER II
EQUAL PROTECTION AND RACE
Early History
Although these United States remained divided in spirit after the
Civil War, the system nonetheless continued to work, and vigorously.
In the course of a decade following the War:, an extraordinary force for
national authority manifested itself in the adoption of three
constitutional amendments . *> And although discussion continues on the
meaning of particular- language and the intentions of particular people,
there is no room for debate about the ultimate impact of that period in
constitutional terms: there was laid the foundation — some would even
say a plan7 — for federal enforcement of civil rights.
The Court's first construction of the Civil War Amendments came in
1873 with the Slaughterhouse Cases . 8 In the course of deciding there
that Louisiana's granting a monopoly to a 17-member corporation did not
offend the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court gave meaning to the Equal
Protection Clause: "We doubt very much whether any action of a State
not directed by way of discrimination against the Negroes as a class or
an account of their race, will ever be held to cone within the purview
of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that
emergency that a strong case would be necessary for its application to
any other. "°
Seven years later:, the Court invoked the emerging power of the
Equal Protection Clause against state statutes excluding Blacks from
service on grand or petit juries. Strauder v. Vfest Virginia^
overturned the murder conviction of a Black man, finding that the Equal
Protection Clause implied for Blacks a "right to exemption from un-
friendly legislation against them distinctively as colored."
The very promising implication announced by the Strauder court was
quickly and severely limited, however, in Plessy v. Ferguson .
H
Dpholding there the "separate but equal" doctrine against Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges, the Court found no capacity in
those amendments to prevent states from assuring the continued "custom"
of racial segregation.
The early limits imposed by the Court on the meaning of "equal
protection" were paralleled in its review of portions of the first
Civil Rights Acts, in cases questioning the authority of the Congress
to enforce provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Civil Rights Cases^ found no constitutional authority for federal
attempts to punish private parties for denying to Blacks equal
enjoyment of public accommodations. The Court there construed Sections
1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the power to
prohibit only "State action of a particular character ....
Individual invasion of individual rights [was] not the subject matter-
of the amendment" (emphasis added).
"
Neither the substance of equal protection nor the federal power to
protect Blacks from discrimination posed any real threat to the racist
habits and customs of the white majority in the Nineteenth and early
Twentieth Centuries. With only a few exceptions, the provisions of
federal law designed to enforce the Civil War Amendments did not fare
well before the Court, and many were repealed by the Congress .
"
Plessy 's constitutional validation of "separate but equal" gave
states a map for continued racist practice: facial neutrality could be
assumed to protect state legislation from equal protection challenge.
And the Court's finding Congress wanting in constitutional authority to
reach any but "[s]tate action of a particular sort" left private
individuals free to live and act upon their: racist, separatist
inclinations
.
To avoid constitutional challenge, local governments contrived a
myriad of clever devices, in addition to separate facilities, to
restrict Blacks in the enjoyment of their fundamental freedoms. Poll
taxes, literacy tests, and white primaries, for example, enabled white
Americans to defy with impunity the spirit of the Civil War: Amendments.
Revolutionary Presumptions : Race and Strict Scrutiny
One might legitimately suppose, reading the historic opinions in
Brown v. Topeka Board of Education15 and Boiling v. Sharpe
,
16 that
their invalidation of the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of
public education followed a long line of decisions compelling their
result. On the contrary, in Brown and Boiling , the Court gave dramatic
and concrete effect to a gradual, profoundly important evolution in
equal protection doctrine. The shift brought home in those decisions
amounted to nothing less than a shift in the constitutional "balance of
power": the traditional deference to the legislatures, with its
presumption of the constitutionality of legislative enactments, was
gone. In its place was a declaration that all classifications based
upon race were constitutionally "suspect" and subject to "strict
scrutiny."
To be sure, Brown did not create suspect classifications and
strict scrutiny. Korematsu v. U.S. ,l7 which in 1944 upheld the
exclusion of citizens of Japanese ancestry from certain areas on the
West Coast during World War: II, had announced that "all legal
restrictions which curtail [ed] the civil rights of a single racial
group [were] imrediately suspect." In 1886, Yick Wb v. Hopkins18 had
overturned a criminal conviction because officials had enforced an
ordinance forbidding the operation of laundries in frame buildings only
against Chinese laundrymen. But Yick Wo , decided ten year's before
Plessy
, clearly did not rest on the strict judicial scrutiny so
unselfconsciously undertaken by the Brown Court.
The judicial and textual power: given such enor-mous, practical
effect by Brown and many cases in its wake were drawn less from
precedent directly on point than from a kind of sense and momentum of
the times. During the two decades preceding, the Court had granted
relief to four: Blacks who challenged, in effect, the "equal" portion of
"separate but equal" in the context of higher: education. 1 9 The reach
of the Fifteenth Amendment, protecting citizens' right to vote from
8
state and federal infringement, had been expanded to prohibit white
primaries . 20 Private contracts forbidding the sale of property to
Blacks, because they depended on state courts for their enforcement,
were found to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 21 find in cases not
involving race, the Court had abandoned the presumption of
constitutionality of legislation in cases involving restrictions of
the exercise of fundamental rights. 22
In the years after Brown , the Court redefined — in constitutional
litigation — the state action requirement of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment: a coffee shop leasing space in a parking
facility built and managed by a state agency was "an integral part of a
public building devoted to a public parking service" and could not
discriminate on the basis race; 23 the "public character" of a municipal
park could thwart the segregationist purposes of a private will; 24 a
state constitutional provision authorizing discrimination in the sale
or rental of housing "involved the State in racial discriminations" and
thus offended the Fourteenth Amendment. 25
As it was prepared to construe "state action" broadly for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes, so was the Court willing to construe
broadly Congress 1 powers in cases involving contemporary versions of
the Civil Rights Acts: the Commerce Clause afforded Congress ample
authority to prohibit racial discrimination in a barbeque joint in
Birmingham, 26 a motel in Atlanta, 27 a second-rate amusement park near
Little Rock. 28
Whatever its sources, then, the meaningful declaration that race
was a suspect classification in the context of public education can now
be seen as having had phenomenal — indeed unique — effect in this
constitutional republic. The interplay of the Court's subsequent
opinions construing the Equal Protection Clause and enactments of
successive sessions of Congress resulted in something like a federal
"search and destroy" mission on the question of discrimination on
account of race.
It was well after the Court's opinions on race had inserted the
federal district courts and the United States Attorney General into
local, day-to-day matters that the Court was asked to rule upon the
constitutionality of racial classifications undertaken for a remedial
purpose. In 1978, the Court decided Regents of Califomia v. Bakke
,
2^
a case challenging the affirmative action admissions program of the
Medical School of the University of Califomia at Davis. For present
purposes it is sufficient to note that a majority of the sharply-
divided Court deemed racial classifications "suspect," but explicitly
allowed for consideration of race in future admissions policies.
Even in the context of affirmative action, then, racial
classifications retained their "inherent suspectness . " A 200-year
history of brutal and systematic exclusion of Blacks from the
mainstream of American life could not spare this racial classification,
with its admittedly wholesome intentions, from strict constitutional
scrutiny.
No wonder, then, that proponents of full constitutional protection
from discrimination on account of sex saw in the Court and the Equal
Protection Clause the potential for realization of full equality of
10
rights. The failure to realize that potential is the substance of the
next chapter's.
11
CHAPTER III
GENDER AND EQUAL PROTECTION: THE "SPECIAL" CASE
The Legacy of Legal Paternalism
Within a few years of the publication of Mill's The Subjection of
Women , the United States Supreme Court decided Bradwell v. Illinois . 30
One Myra Bradwell, upon being denied a license to practice law by the
Supreme Court of Illinois solely because she was female, brought suit
challenging that denial as a deprivation of the "privileges and
imnunities" of citizenship protected from state interference by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 31
More interesting for present purposes than the Court's conclusion
that admission to the bar- was not a "privilege or immunity" of U.S.
citizenship protected from state interference by Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the attitude toward women betrayed in Mr.
Justice Bradley's concurring opinion:
[T]he civil law, as well as Nature herself, has
always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector
and defender. The natural and proper timidity
12
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the
law of the Creator. 32
In 1874 the Court decided yet another: case, with more devastating
effect to the cause of equality of rights for women. 33 Virginia Minor
brought suit claiming that her right to vote was a privilege and
immunity of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court, however, disagreed, and, as in Bradwell , the tone of the opinion
is as interesting as the rule of law: although women were certainly
"persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and although
they might be citizens, the Constitution did not guarantee them the
right to vote. After all, reasoned the Court, children were persons
and citizens and they could not vote;
Whatever "equality" meant during the Nineteenth Century, it did
not prevent the systematic exclusion of women from certain employment,
and, more importantly, from the polling place. And though women earned
the vote in 1920 with the Nineteenth Amendment, the unselfconsciously
paternalistic attitude of the Court carried well into the Twentieth
Century.
Shortly after the turn of the century, the Court decided Muller v.
Oregon , 34 a case challenging the validity of an Oregon statute
restricting the hour's women could work in laundries to ten per day.
The full significance of Muller to women's rights can only be
understood when it is viewed against Lochner v. New York , 35 a case
decided three year's earlier.
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At issue in Lochner was a provision of the New York Code
restricting the number of hours a baker: could work to ten a day and 60
in a week. The Court rejected the State's claim that the statute was a
reasonable exercise of its power- to legislate for the public health and
the health of individual bakers, and found instead that the statute,
contrary to the Due Process Clause, was an unconstitutional
interference with "... the freedom of master- and employee to contract
with each other: in relation to their employment. . . (emphasis
added). 36
Then came Mailer, questioning the constitutionality of a provision
of the Oregon Code very much like the one struck down in Lochner
,
except that the statute in Muller spoke only to women's labor. The
Court's upholding the Oregon statute, while explicitly affirming its
decision in Lochner , required its distinguishing not statutes , but
people, male and female, and effectively defining for us "the female
condition"
:
[W]oman has always been dependent upon man. He
established his control at the outset by
superior: physical strength, and this control in
various forms, with diminishing intensity, has
continued . . . . [S]he has been looked upon in
the courts as needing especial care ....
[S]he is not an equal competitor with her
brother .... [T]here is that in her:
disposition . . . which will operate against a
full assertion of those rights .... [S]he is
properly placed in a class by herself. . . .
[S]he is so constituted that she will rest upon
and look to him for protection . . . (emphasis
added). 37
It is not surprising that, in the cases after Muller challenging
similar: state statutes, there appeared only one female employee
14
complainant; all other: cases were brought by employers charged with
violating statutes regulating hours of work for women. 38
Forty years later:, in Goesaert v. Cleary
,
39 the Court considered
the constitutionality of a Michigan statute forbidding the licensing of
female bar-tenders, except wives or daughters of male tavern owners.
It is worth noting here, although the attempt failed, that the
Goesaert challenge rested on a claim of denial of the Equal Protection
of the Laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying the
standard rational relationship test, and in an opinion that clearly
viewed the claim as trivial, the Court found the statute
constitutionally sound.
As late as 1961, the Court gave legal voice to blatantly sexist
attitudes in its opinion in Hoyt v. Florida . 40 Arising as it did from
the assertion of a defendant's right to a jury trial, the case did not
present an uncomplicated gender claim. Gwendolyn Hoyt unsuccessfully
challenged there her criminal conviction, claiming a Florida jury
statute granting women, as women
, an absolute exemption from jury duty,
unless they voluntarily registered for jury service, violated her
rights as a defendant under: the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion is
nonetheless valuable here, for its illumination of the judicial
attitude toward women:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of '/somen
from the restrictions of bygone years, and
their entry into many parts of community life
formerly considered to be reserved to men,
woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life. We cannot say that it is
constitutionally impermissible for a State,
acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to
15
conclude that a woman should be relieved from
the civic duty of jury service ... .41
I will leave for the final chapter discussion of the relevance of
that very recent example of presumptions of the "proper" and
"preferred" role of women. For the moment I only suggest that the
reader consider the similarities between this vision of women and that
of the benevolent, paternalistic slaveholder: toward Black Americans.
In Search of a Contemporary Standard
It was the prestigious and influential California Supreme Court
which first opened the possibility of constitutional protection from
gender discrimination similar: to that afforded in cases involving race.
In 1971 that court considered the constitutionality of a state
provision prohibiting women from tending bar' unless they or their
husbands held the liquor license.
Concluding in Sail'er Inn v. Kirby42 that a statute involving the
fundamental right of lawful occupation and classifying persons on the
basis of sex demanded strict scrutiny, that opinion gave eloquent voice
to the call for full constitutional protection from gender-
discrimination: "Sex, like race or lineage, is an immutable trait, a
status into which the class members are locked by the accident of
birth." And later:: "The pedestal upon which women have been placed
has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage."
A detailed look at a United States Supreme Court opinion of the
same year:, however, reveals the early ambivalence of that body on the
question of gender classification. Challenged in Reed v. Reed^3 was an
16
Idaho statute giving mandatory preference, within given statutorily-
defined entitlement classes, to male over female applicants to
administer estates. The Court struck down the statute as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause , but not , as Sally Reed ' s attorneys had
urged, because sex was, like race, a suspect classification. The Court
found instead that the statute had "established] a classification
subject to scrutiny under: the Equal Protection Clause" (emphasis
added), 44 and, under a rational relationship test, had failed to
survive that scrutiny.
The Reed Court found that the first of Idaho's objectives, "merely
to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, [was] the very
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause ..." (emphasis added). 45 Noting that a companion statute had
the objective of "establish! ing] degrees of entitlement of various
classes of persons in accordance with their varying degrees of
relationship to the intestate," the Court found "persons within any one
of the enumerated classes . . . similarly situated with respect to that
objective" (emphasis added). 46
The unanimous Reed Court had made a subtle but profoundly
important shift. All legislation classifies and all judicial review of
legislation is, in fact, judicial "scrutiny." But the use of the word
"scrutiny" had theretofore been reserved to cases involving suspect
classifications or interference with the exercise of fundamental
rights, and had triggered application of a "compelling interest" test.
In Reed , the Court made the classification itself an issue, but then
subjected it to the traditional rational relationship test.
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I call attention to this hybrid of constitutional standards,
endorsed by all eight of the justices participating, as an example of
judicial confusion, or at least a failure of judicial clarity. And as
later reliance on Reed will show, that confusion was neither static or
innocuous
.
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson , four members of the
Court followed the lead of the California Supreme Court's Sail'er Inn
decision. An opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan and joined by
Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall concluded "that classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or
national origin [were] inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."^
The questioned federal statute required female — but not male —
armed forces members seeking increased quarters allowances and spousal
benefits to prove that their spouses were dependent on them for one-
half of their support. Eight justices joined the Court's judgment that
the statute was offensive to the so-called "equal protection prong" of
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, but there were two concurring
opinions.
The concurring opinions in Frontiero deserve special attention.
They are alike in their reliance on Reed as authority for the result,
but different in substance. Mr. Justice Stewart very tersely noted
invidious discrimination and cited Reed.*"
Mr. Justice Powell's opinion, on the other hand, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, explicitly rejected the Brennan
rationale, finding it "unnecessary for the Court in [that] case to
18
characterize sex as a suspect classification, with all of the far-
reaching implications of such a holding. "49 Asserting further that
Reed had not added sex to the list of suspect classifications, Justice
Powell argued that the Court should "reserve for the future any
expansion of its rationale. "50
Of particular: interest is this language from Justice Powell '
s
opinion:
There is another, and I find compelling , reason
for deferring a general categorizing of sex
classifications as invoking the strictest test
of judicial scrutiny. The Equal Rights
Amendment, which if adopted would resolve the
substance of this precise question, has been
approved by the Congress and submitted for
ratification by the States .... [T]his
reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a
major political decision which is currently in
process of resolution does not reflect
appropriate respect for duly prescribed
legislative processes (emphasis added). 51
Ironically, Justice Brennan's argument for suspect
classification also relied on the ERA: "... Congress itself has
concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious,
and this conclusion of a coequal brand of Government is not without
significance to the question . . . under consideration. "52
The lack of a clear: majority on the precise ground for the
Frontiero ruling posed a question to legal observers and practitioners
as to its precedential value; the question would not wait long for an
answer. A year later:, in Kahn v. Shevin ,53 an opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas representing the views of six members of the Court signaled a
clear retreat from Frontiero Upholding a Florida statute granting an
automatic property tax exemption to all widows against an Equal
19
Protection challenge, the opinion found the statute "reasonably
designed to further a state policy of cushioning the financial impact
of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss [imposed] a
disproportionately heavy burden." 54
Especially disturbing about the Kahn majority opinion are the
conspicuous absence of any mention at all of "suspectness" and its
compelling interest companion, and the fact that Justice Douglas wrote
the opinion. A mere eleven months after his agreement in Frontiero
that sex was a suspect classification, he found the simple
"reasonableness" of the Kahn statute adequate to sustain the
constitutionality of its gender classification.
It is true that the majority opinion in Kahn evidenced particular
concern for the remedial intent of the statute, that is, to compensate
women as a class for their economic hardships as a class. But as
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion made clear', respect for that
remedial intent did not preclude application of strict scrutiny. 55 He
in fact argued persuasively that "the need for remedial measures" was
compelling, while concluding that the Florida measure, because it
benefitted widows who were not in fact needy, lacked the precision
necessary to survive that most stringent constitutional test.
The Kahn majority allowed the intent of the measure to do what
intent could never do in a race case, govern the choice of
constitutional standard. In race cases, the very existence of a
classification — intentions notwithstanding — compels application of
strict scrutiny.
Two other opinions from 1974 offer further evidence of the Court's
20
refusal to construe the Equal Protection Clause broadly in gender-
cases. The first considered the constitutionality of the lengthy,
mandatory maternity leave policies of school districts in Chesterfield
County, Virginia, and Cleveland, Ohio. 56 Federal appellate courts had
issued contradictory rulings on the similar policies, on equal
protection grounds.
The Supreme Court ignored completely the equal protection claims,
finding instead that forcing pregnant teachers to take unpaid leave at
four or five months unfairly and unnecessarily interfered with their
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life."
The Court found that the rules created an "irrebuttable presumption"
and thus could not survive the more stringent constitutional test
triggered by infringement of a basic freedom protected from state
interference by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 57
It is worth noting that the Court explicitly approved the
Chesterfield County re-employment rules, which provided, in part, that
a teacher would be eligible for re-employment upon written notice from
her physician of fitness, "and when she [could] give full assurance
that care of the child [would] cause minimal interference with job
responsibilities .
"
5"
No member of the Court noticed the presumption implicit in that
rule, namely, that babies — and their "interference potential" — were
the responsibility not of parents, but of mothers.
Pregnancy was again at issue at Geduldiq v. Aiello
,
5^ decided six
months after La Fleur . Challenged there was the State of California
disability insurance program which excluded coverage for normal
21
pregnancy. (At its inception, the plan had excluded all pregnancy-
related disability, but litigation in the California courts had
resulted in a narrowing of the exclusion . )
°"
The Court, in concluding that the plan's exclusion of pregnancy
did not establish a gender classification at all, betrayed a
dismissive attitude: "The lack of identity between the excluded
disability and gender as such becomes clear' upon the most cursory
analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups —
pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. "61
Although the Geduldig majority failed to take this equal
protection challenge seriously, the three dissenting justices did. By
limiting disabilities for which women could recover while giving men
full compensation for all disabilities, even those affecting only men,
California had created a double standard.
Moreover, warned the dissent, "[t]he Court's decision threaten[ed]
to return men and women to a time when 'traditional' equal protection
analysis sustained legislative classifications that treated differently
members of a particular sex solely because of their sex. "62
The passionate call by the Geduldig dissenters for a finding of
"suspectness" is more than a little curious, however:, when viewed
against their stances in La Fleur . All had joined that majority
opinion (although Mr. Justice Douglas had felt compelled to concur' with
the result and without comment ) , and none had noticed its reliance on
Due Process — instead of Equal Protection — grounds.
If three 1975 opinions failed to establish any firm standards for
gender: discrimination cases, that very failure served to crystallize
22
what Kahn and successive cases had suggested, that the Court did not
view gender classification in anything like the sarre light as it viewed
racial classification.
Schlesinger v. Ballard6^ upheld as "rational" a federal statute
granting longer: "up and out" tine for female than for male naval line
officers. Distinguishing that statute from those at issue in Reed and
Frontiero which "were premised on overbroad generalizations," the Court
found that the Schlesinger statute rested "instead on the demonstrable
fact that male and female line officers in the Navy [were] not
similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional
service. "*>4
In Schlesinger
,
once again, the Court allowed asserted intent to
define the constitutional standard. The same immediate result might
well have obtained under application of strict scrutiny, especially in
view of the Court's deference to Congress' constitutional authority
over the armed forces.
Whatever hope the Schlesinger dissenter's might have offered for a
more powerful construction of the Equal Protection Clause vanished with
the Stanton v. Stanton65 opinion in which they all joined. In an
opinion delivered only three months after Schlesinger , the Stanton
majority, citing Reed , explicitly refused to decide whether a
classification based on sex was inherently suspect. The challenged
statute, which established different ages of majority for males and
females, could not "under any test — compelling state interest, or
rational basis, or something in between ... in the context of child
support . . . survive an equal protection attack." 66
23
A month before, in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld ,67 the Court had found
a section of the Social Security Act "indistinguishable from that
invalidated in Frontiero ,"68 and violative of the Due Process Clause
right to equal protection.
Of the eight members participating and agreeing, for one reason or
another:, that the statute at issue in Weinberger was invalid, only
Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger insisted that the
discrimination worked by the statute was against female wage earners.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist found the statute simply irrational. The
majority opinion found "entirely irrational" the discrimination "among
surviving children solely on the basis of the sex of the surviving
parent" (emphasis added). 69
If the first half of the 1970 's did not produce constitutional
doctrine preventing discrimination on account of sex, there occurred
then at least a judicial "change of heart" on the matter of
automatically exempting women from jury duty. Taylor v. Louisiana^"
challenged a Louisiana criminal conviction on the ground that the
defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury, protected by the Sixth
Amendment, had been denied.
Concluding that "[t]he right to a proper jury [could] not be
overcome on merely rational grounds,
"
71 and finding that the all-male
venires at issue were not fairly representative of the local population
and therefore could not produce "proper" juries, the Court overturned
Taylor's conviction.
Although Taylor clearly does not "fit" with the other cases at
hand, it is worthy of mention for its rejection of the argument that
24
women played a distinctive role in society that justified their
exemption, 72 and especially for the example it affords of the Court's
willingness to strain the traces of federalism where a fundamental
right is at issue.
The table on page 26 gives summary visual effect to the Court's
ambivalence during these early year's of consideration of the reach of
the Equal Protection Clause where gender: classifications were at issue.
I have excluded La Fleur because the Court ignored the equal protection
question raised there, and Taylor , for obvious reasons. I have also
deliberately ignored distinctions among majority, concurring, and
dissenting positions. For the present purpose of distinguishing equal
protection analyses, that data is, I believe, irrelevant.
The Table on page 27 considers the same cases through the lens of
federalism, and clearly shows that judicial deference to the
principles of federalism cannot explain the Court's actions in these
gender cases.
As the tables illustrate, the Court was not prepared either to
deem sex a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny or to view
sex in precisely the same light as it had legislative classification
subjected to the traditional rational relationship test. There is
simply no escaping the fact that by 1975 a noticeably uncomfortable
Court wanted a standard for gender cases. Unfortunately, as the next
chapter will demonstrate, "simple" articulation of a new standard would
not yield a standard capable of simple definition or application.
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CHAPTER IV
GENDER AND EQUAL PROTECTION:
THE INTERMEDIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
The "something in between" to which the Stanton7 3 majority alluded
(and to which the Court, since Reed , had in fact frequently resorted)
was made explicit in 1976. Craig v. Boren7^ found a pair of Oklahoma
statutes forbidding the sale of 3.2 beer to females under: the age of 18
and to males under the age of 21, offensive to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Craig court announced "that classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to those objectives. "75 Then, applying its variation of simple
scrutiny and accepting as "important" Oklahoma's objective — traffic
safety — the Court found the statutes nonetheless flawed, because the
relationship between the classification and the objective was not
sufficiently " substantial .
"
Application of this substantial relationship portion of the test
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required the majority's engaging in activity not commonly under-taken by
the judiciary, namely, critique of the state's statistical rationale.
After asserting that it was "unrealistic to expect either member's of
the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors of
experimental or statistical technique, " 7*> the opinion ironically rested
on "the obvious methodological problems" 77 of Oklahoma's surveys, and
the "unduly tenuous 'fit'"78 between gender and arrests for driving
under the influence.
Although there were only two dissents from Craig , there were six
separate opinions, 7^ four' of which expressed serious reservations
about the majority's standard of equal protection analysis. SO Those
reservations notwithstanding, however, the standard articulated in
Craig prevails today.
The balance of this chapter will be devoted to examination of the
application of Craig ' s "diaphanous and elastic""! standard in
subsequent cases. With the exception only of one women's rights
case, "2 which presented a right of action question, not an equal
protection challenge to legislative classification, I will analyze each
opinion in search of some common basis in logic for the Court's various
definitions of "substantial" and "important."
I will treat the controversies in five categories. Most cases
involve differential treatment of men and women as wage earners and
survivors of wage earners. Others challenge different treatment of
males and females as parties in marriage and divorce, as parents of
illegitimate children, as students in professional school, and as
persons and citizens.
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Men and Women as Wage Earners and Survivors of Wage Earners
Barely three months after the Craig decision, the Court decided
Califano v. Goldfarb . 83 At issue there were provisions of federal
social security legislation automatically granting survivor's benefits
to widows of covered workers, but requiring widowers to prove that they
had depended on their deceased spouses for one-half of their support.
Explicitly invoking the Craig standard, 84 the Court looked
carefully at the legislative history of the provision for the requisite
important governmental objective. Noting that the act had no
compensatory purpose, 85 that it was clearly intended to provide for
dependent (as opposed to needy ) survivors , 8 *> and that the presumption
of wives
' dependency was based on " ' archaic and overbroad
generalizations,'"87 the Court invalidated the legislative
classification.
Days later, the Court upheld a section of the social security acts
that until 1972 had permitted women to exclude, for purposes of average
monthly wages and benefit calculation, three more lower: earning years
than could men of the same age. 88
In a per curiam opinion the Court found that "[rjeduction of the
disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the
long history of discrimination against women [had] been recognized as .
. .
an important governmental objective."89
As interesting for present purposes as the result in Webster is
the very terse concurring opinion, 90 which, by relying on Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Goldfarb, 91 evidenced fundamental, lingering
questions about an appropriate equal protection standard in gender
30
cases. That dissent had insisted that, at least in the area of social
insurance, simple rationality and administrative convenience were
sufficient to sustain gender classifications against equal protection
challenge.
It is surprising, then, that in Califano v. »festcott ,92 decided
only two year's later, there was apparent unanimity on the question of
the proper level of equal protection analysis. The separate opinion
filed by four: justices concurred with the finding of
unconstitutionality, dissented only from the remedy ordered, and made
no mention whatever of equal protection standards. 93
Although the Westcott opinion showed agreement on the appropriate
equal protection standard, it exemplifies particularly well the
complexity and difficulty of that standard in practice. At issue again
was a provision of federal social security law, in this instance,
assistance to families with children made needy by a father '
s
unemployment.
Readily agreeing that sustenance for children and promotion of
family stability were important governmental objectives, the Court went
on to describe the legislative burden required to sustain such a
classification. The HEW Secretary's assertion of "'solid statistical
evidence' that fathers [were] more susceptible to pressure to desert
than mothers" 94 was found lacking. The required showing, said the
Court, was "that a father [had] less incentive to desert in a family
where the mother [was] the breadwinner and [became] unemployed, than in
a family where the father: [was] the breadwinner and [became]
unemployed ." 95
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I highlight this opinion and this language because, although it
contains no mention of presumptions per se, there is certainly imbedded
in it a presumption of unconstitutionality. And, given the challenge
of amassing the sort of statistical support the Court deemed necessary
for establishment of the "substantial relationship," a presumption not
easily overcome.
A year: after Wescott
, the Court considered gender classification
in a state social insurance program. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Insurance Co. 96 challenged a provision of the Missouri workers'
compensation laws requiring of widowers, but not widows, proof of
dependency or mental or physical incapacity in order to claim
survivors' benefits after work-related spousal death.
Although "[p]roviding for needy spouses [was] surely an important
governmental objective," 97 Missouri failed to show that its
discrimination substantially served that end. Once again, a
presumption of unconstitutionality was implicit in the opinion. The
Court not only spoke directly to "[t]he burden ... on those defending
the discrimination to make out the claimed justification" (emphasis
added), 98 its ensuing discussion infused the "substantial
relationship" language with great power. The question in Wengler was
not really whether the classification was "substantially related" to
Missouri's objective, but whether it was, in fact, essential, whether
Missouri could accomplish its wholesome purpose without gender-
classification.
The most recent equal protection challenge to gender
classification in the context of social insurance was decided in 1984.
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Heckler: v. Matthews^ sustained Congress ' temporary revival of a
gender classification invalidated seven year's earlier by Goldfarb .
The gender classification at issue extended to all widows and
wives of disabled or retired workers, for a five-year period, an
exception to Congress 1 pension offset plan, while requiring that
husbands and widowers qualify for the exception by proving dependence.
Finding Congress 1 objective was "to protect reliance on prior law,
not to reassert the sexist assumptions rejected in Goldfarb , "100 the
Court had "little trouble concluding that the means employed by the
statute [were] 'substantially related to the achievement of [that]
objective. '
"
101
The remaining case in this section presented a claim very
different frcm those discussed thus far, and did not arise in the
context of social insurance. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney1-02 challenged the state's veteran's preference because it had
the effect of freezing women out of the best of Massachusetts' civil
service positions.
Acknowledging that "[t]o the extent that the status of veteran
[was] one that few women [had] been enabled to achieve, every hiring
preference for veterans . . . [was] inherently gender-biased," 103 the
Court nonetheless sustained the statute. Appellee Feeney failed to
persuade the majority that a disci:iminatory purpose could be inferred
from Massachusetts' knowledge of its statute's "natural and
foreseeable," even "inevitable" consequence, the foreclosing of
employment opportunities for women. 104
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Men and Women as Parties in Marriage and Divorce
In a 1979 case, the Court invalidated Alabama statutes providing
that men, but not women, could be required to pay alimony. 105 One Mr.
Orr had challenged the provision as an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection during a contempt proceeding resulting from his failure to
make payments to his ex-wife.
The Court determined that Alabama could have two constitutionally
permissible objectives: to provide for needy ex-spouses, or to
compensate women for discrimination in marriage. The remaining
question was, then, whether the state could use sex as a proxy for
need. Noting that Alabama already required individualized hearings on
divorcing parties ' relative financial circumstances , the Court found
the statutory distinction "perverse" in its results, "• and
unconstitutional
.
By the time the Court decided Kirchberq v. Feenstra
,
1^ the
Louisiana statute challenged there had been repealed, and the state had
withdrawn from the litigation. That statute had granted to husbands
exclusive authority over community property, an authority Mr. Feenstra
had exercised in 1974 when he unilaterally signed over an interest in
the couple's jointly-owned horns to Kirchberg, an attorney, as security
for Kirchberg 's representing him in a criminal matter.
Ms. Feenstra 's constitutional challenge to the "head and master"
statute arose in an action under the federal Truth in Lending Act, an
action commenced by Kirchberg subsequent to his foreclosing on the
mortgage.
The Kirchberg opinion contributes nothing to an elucidation of
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equal protection standards generally, or the Craig standard in
particular. I have included it, however, for the examples it affords
of the obnoxious "state of state law" and the mindset of sane members
of the federal bench barely a decade ago. It was 1977 when the
District Court summarily dismissed Ms. Feenstra's constitutional claim
and described it as an attack on " ' the bedrock of Louisiana ' s community
property system . . . .'"108
Men and Women as Parents of Illegitimate Children
Two of the three opinions in cases involving differential
treatment of men and women as parents of illegitimate children were
delivered on the same day and employed, somewhat remarkably, different
constitutional tests. At issue in Parham v. Hughes 1-09 was a Georgia
statute which permitted mothers of illegitimate children to sue for the
wrongful death of a child, but allowed fathers of illegitimate children
to sue only if there was no mother and the father had legitimated the
child.
Although the majority cited Craig and many other gender cases, the
opinion lacked any mention of the particular: language of Craig . It
instead began with "[t]he threshold question . . . whether: the Georgia
statute [was] invidiously discriminatory." 110 Then, finding that "the
statutory classification [did] not discriminate against fathers as a
class but instead distinguish [ed] between fathers who [had]
legitimated their children and those who [had] not," 111 the Court found
the statute rationally related to an acceptable state objective and
therefore constitutional
.
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The Caban v. Mohammad -*--*-** opinion of the same day did apply the
Craig test. Caban challenged a New York statute effectively granting
to unwed mothers — but not unwed fathers — the right to block
adoption of their children by withholding consent. Action consistent
with that statute had permitted the mother of Caban 's children and her
husband to adopt the children, although he had "established a
substantial relationship with the child[ren] and [had] admitted
paternity . . . ." 113
Although giving great weight to the state's interest in promoting
the well-being of illegitimate children and preventing undue delay in
adoption, the Court rejected the state's justifications for its gender
distinction. That distinction, said the majority, was not "required by
anv universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at
every phase of a child's development, ""•' and thus bore no substantial
relationship to the state's asserted interests.
Four- year's later the Court rejected the equal protection claim of
another New York unwed father. U5 The provisions challenged gave to
the mother' of an illegitimate child the rights to veto an adoption and
to prior notice of any adoption proceeding, while affording those
rights to only certain fathers. *** It is apparent that New York had
noticed and seized upon the "loophole" suggested by the majority in
Caban . 117
Lehr's 28-month-old daughter had been adopted by the child's
mother' and her' husband, even as he awaited action on his visitation and
paternity petition. The majority, obviously heavily influenced by the
fact that Lehr had not established a relationship with his child, H8
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had little difficulty finding the requisite substantial relationship
between New York's gender distinction and its interest in "prompt and
certain adoption procedures."
Men and Women as Students in Professional School
In his sharp dissent from the decision in Mississippi University
for Women v. Joe Hogan , Justice Louis Powell accused the Court of
"frustrat[ing] the liberating spirit of the Equal Protection
Clause." 120 From his point of view, the decision had the effect of
depriving women of the choice of sex-segregated nursing education.
The suit had been brought by a practicing male nurse, Joe Hogan,
after he was denied admission to the nursing baccalaureate program
solely on the basis of his sex. Although Mississippi offered two
coeducational nursing programs at other locations, Mr. Hogan wished to
pursue a degree in the city where he lived and worked.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
appears at first glance to involve a routine application of the Craig
standard, in that it begins with examination of the state's objectives
and ends with analysis of the relationship between the gender
distinction and those objectives. But more careful reading reveals a
radical shift in judicial attention from the short- to the long-term
causes and implications of the gender: classification.
Justice O'Connor's reliance on evidence of the traditional female
"ownership" of nursing and the ANA's claim that exclusion of men from
nursing depressed nurses' wages121- demonstrated that hers was not the
customary judicial interest in "archaic and overbroad generalizations":
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"...MUW's policy of excluding males from admission to the School of
Nursing tend[ed] to perpetuate the stereotypical view of nursing as an
exclusively woman's job." Moreover, she said, the policy "[lent]
credibility to the old view that women, not men, should become nurses,
and [made] the assumption that nursing is a field for women a self-
fulfilling prophecy" (emphasis added). 122
Ihe opinion introduced novel considerations to the Court's
continuing struggle with gender discrimination. For the first time, a
majority acknowledged — albeit implicitly — the power of
socialization, the devaluation of women's work, and the connection
between the two.
To the dissenters' claim of a "frustrated liberating spirit," the
majority effectively said: "The 'choice' you cite is not choice at
all; it is the product of historic, discriminatory stereotypes, and
permitting its continuation would assure perpetuation of those
stereotypes .
"
The Craig analysis, as applied in Mississippi U. , had become a
decidedly feminist analysis.
Males and Females as Persons and Citizens
With the exception only of Craig , every case in this chapter has
dealt with men and women as they were, if you will, caught in the act
of playing particular: roles. They have found men and women behaving
and affected as workers, students, parents, spouses, ex-spouses, and
surviving spouses.
The cases in this section, on the other hand, view men and women
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in a very different light. And though they involve unrelated statutes
and fact situations, they are alike in an essential way: each involves
legislation that, at bottom, distinguishes between males and females as
beings, as responsible members of society.
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Courtl23 upheld a California
law that made only men criminally liable for statutory rape. Michael
M. was charged under the statute when he was 17 1/2 years old for
having had intercourse with a 16 1/2-year-old girl.
Applying the Craig analysis, the majority easily deferred to the
legislative judgment that prevention of teen-age pregnancy was an
important governmental objective (in spite of evidence offered by the
dissent that protection of girls' "virtue" was apparently the state's
actual objective).
I
24 The opinion then permitted the State of
California — operating under a significantly lighter burden than had
the State of Missouri in Wengler — to establish the substantial
relationship nexus by the mere assertion that a gender neutral law
would be more difficult to enforce.
The result in Michael M. was constitutional approval for the
codification of a vision of young women as passive and in need of
special protection because they have the capacity to become pregnant.
Males, even minor males, can be assigned sole, criminal responsibility
because they have the capacity to "cause" pregnancy. All girls, as
"potentially-pregnant persons," are found to labor under a special
burden imposed by Nature. And the state can constitutionally equalize
that biological burden by imposing on males — but not females — a
criminal burden for participation in the act that causes pregnancy
i
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Like Michael M. , Rostker v. Goldberg^-25 considered differential
treatment of men and women as responsible individuals. Unlike Michael
M. , the statutory distinction in Rostker was between adult men and
women in relation to their national government. The case sustained
federal legislation distinguishing males' and females' obligations to
serve their country.
In light of Congress ' explicit textual responsibility to provide
for the national defense, the Rostker majority's extreme deference to
the legislature was entirely predictable. What was not so predictable
was the Court's reduction — under: a Craig analysis — of the
government's burden in establishing the necessary substantial
relationship between discrimination and governmental objective.
Six members of the Court found Congress' exemption of women from
registration for the draft constitutionally permissible. To do so
required their dismissing the fact that then President Carter had
requested the registration of women as well as men, and ignoring
Congressional testimony by all four: branches of the armed forces that
registration of women was consistent with military readiness.
TAKING STOCK
In a discussion of traditional equal protection analysis, Leslie
Friedman Goldstein has described the "reasonableness" portion of that
analysis as "accordionlike." 126 Her: term applies particularly well to
the "substantial relationship" prong of the Craig test.
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the Court, although
now agreeing — at least superficially — on the level of scrutiny
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applicable in gender cases, interprets the demands of that scrutiny
very differently from case to case. At times the government is
required to demonstrate that its objective could not be accomplished
with gender neutral legislation; 127 at others, the legislative burden
virtually disappears , and rationality alone suffices. 128
Moreover, in spite of the general agreement that the third level
of scrutiny is triggered in gender discrimination cases, there is
continuing disagreement over what constitutes a gender: discrimination
case. There persists, in other words, the opinion that not every
legislative distinction between the sexes requires special judicial
attention at all. 129
In the final chapter I will examine some political and
philosophical reasons for our being in this constitutional never-never-
land on the question of gender. Just now I refer the reader to the
tables on pages 43-45. Table III summarizes the cases in this chapter-
in terms of their impact. Tables IV & V examine the individual records
of the justices in the same cases and reveal definite patterns:
William Brennan and Byron White, for instance, voted to invalidate
gender classifications in 12 of the 15 cases; Thurgood Marshall would
have invalidated 13 of the 15; now-Chief Justice William Rehnquist
would have upheld all but two. And all under "the" Craig standard.
This summary of the justices' records is sobering in light of the
ages of the three justices most consistently voting against gender
discriminations: William Brennan is eighty-two; Byron White is
seventy-one; Thurgood Marshall is eighty. There is thus a high
probability that one or more of them will leave the Court during George
41
Bush's presidency. Given the president-elect's philosophy, we cannot
expect that his appointees will maintain the strong stance against sex
discrimination of these three justices.
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Table III
Summary of the Impact of Decisions in Cases Challenging the
Constitutionality of Various Gender Classifications, 1976-84
Craig
Goldfarb
Orr
Caban
Wengler
Mississippi U.
Extended to raen benefits, advantages
or rights theretofore reserved by
statute to women.
Personnel Admin. MA
Continued statutory employment
opportunity advantage to a class
composed, by virtue of historic dis-
crimination, overwhelmingly of males.
Westcott
Extended to needy children of
unemployed, bread^winning mothers
benefits equal to those available
to needy children of unemployed,
bread-winning fathers.
Kirchberg
Relieved women of a statutory-
disadvantage in state community
property law.
Webster
Heckler
Parham
Lehr
Permitted certain women eligible for
retirement in 1975 to retain benefit
calculation advantage conferred to
them by statute before 1972.
Temporarily revived a distinction
giving an advantage to certain women in
the context of social security.
Preserved statutory advantage of some
mothers of illegitimate children over-
seme fathers of illegitimate children.
Rostker
Michael M.
Preserved statutory distinctions
placing certain responsibilities on
males and not females.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
It remains now to place the cases since Reed within the broader-
political context. For while it is true that the Court is, by
comparison to its coequal branches, insulated from the political realm,
the same Constitution which affords that insulation also prohibits the
Court's functioning in a vacuum.
It is not possible to ascertain whether the Court's subjecting the
gender classification in Reed to something more stringent than
traditional equal protection analysis bore any relation to Congress'
simultaneous action to move the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. It is
clear, however, that once the Amendment had been passed by the Congress
and submitted to the states, the judicial debate over whether strict
scrutiny was appropriately applied in gender cases waited for its
resolution on the people, or more precisely, on their representatives
in the various state legislatures.
Although opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment made a variety of
claims about the Amendment's probable impact, it is apparent that
members of the Court on both sides of the debate over the proper: level
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of equal protection analysis in gender cases expected the Amendment to
establish a constitutional imperative that gender distinctions receive
the same judicial scrutiny as did classifications based upon race or
national origin. Thus the Frontiero concurring opinion's appeal to
wait on "[t]he Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted [would] resolve
the substance" of the questions. 130 Remember as well Justice Brennan's
reminder there that "Congress itself [had] concluded that
classifications based upon sex [were] inherently invidious .... "131
I noted earlier: in this study the irony in the resort to the ERA
both by justices supporting and by those opposing the designation of
sex as a suspect classification. The greater irony is this: had the
Amendment not been before the people during this period, it is possible
that a majority of the court would have deemed sex a suspect
classification, in recognition of something like an "evolving standard
of equality." We are after all not without examples of the Court's
taking a leadership role in social change by permitting the
Constitution to reflect contemporary standards. Racial discrimination
is, of course, the paradigm.
But the amendment process was set in motion in 1972, and once it
was, the Court's refusal to effect the proposed amendment's intended
result by construction of existing text was compelled by the
Constitution itself. It is one thing for an activist Court to reflect
— even to press — change in the process of constitutional
adjudication. It is another thing altogether for the Court, in the
context of the constitutionally-determined amendment process, to
anticipate the result of that process. The former is a vigorous
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exercise of constitutional authority; the latter is an
extraconstitutional imposition of judicial will.
It is quite probably the case that the short-lived stance in favor
of suspect classifications taken by Justices Brennan, Marshall, White,
and Douglas was merely a reflection of their expectation that the ERA
would be ratified, and quickly. The Amendment's early progress in the
states was, after all impressive, "* as were the nature and extent of
its popular: support as evidenced in opinion polls taken throughout the
decade. 133
By the time the Amendment lost momentum in 1975, the Court had
settled into a kind of constitutional "holding pattern": unable to make
sex a suspect classification and unwilling to relegate it to the
position of those classifications commanding only a rational
relationship analysis, the Court sought "something in between."
Craig ' s intermediate level of equal protection analysis is the result.
It is cold comfort for ERA proponents but worth nothing
nonetheless that the Constitution's design proved itself anew during
this period. The Framers clearly and appropriately viewed stability to
be of paramount importance, even to the point of permitting — as was
the case with ERA — a minority to thwart the will of the majority.
The tensions so carefully designed into the system functioned
perfectly.
In the meantime, a variety of federal statutory provisions have
brought about piecemeal progress toward legal equality of the sexes. A
summary of the Court's decisions in cases construing those provisions
is appended. But the best statute given the most powerful construction
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is a very poor substitute for a constitutional guarantee. Legislators
are fickle creatures, subject to diverse and constantly changing
pressures. They engage necessarily in day-to-day political bartering,
a priority here for a priority there, a vote now for a vote later:.
A very relevant example of the comparatively haphazard methods of
legislative bodies is afforded by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964: sex was added to the list of protected classes by a conservative
southern senator in an attempt to block passage of the measure.
Fortunately, the Johnson Administration was determined to see Blacks
afforded protection from employment discrimination and threw its
considerable weight behind passage. 134 This important federal
provision now taken for granted was thus not the product of a plan, but
rather the result of a fortuitous political accident. And, like any
statutory measure, its future depends on the wishes and the will of
future majorities in the Congress.
In a 1977 speech, Congresswcman Margaret Heckler likened the
"incomplete solutions" of statutory measures to the beginnings of the
age of flight, when human beings devised a series of crude contraptions
in order to defy gravity. Only when they added the engine, the power,
she observed, were they able to escape from the forces that keep them
earthbound:
The Equal Rights Amendment is the power.- of
constitutional protection that will allow
women's equality to become airborne. Without
the ERA women's equality will continue to flap
its wings, making small leaps forward,
struggling against the forces that hold us
down. With the ERA, we will have the power,
the constitutional foundation to soar above our
current limitations, limitations which have
bound us to limited choice of opportunity ....
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A country that can put men on the moon can put
women in the Constitution .... 135
Clearly we have "coma a long way" in out: quest for legal equality
of the sexes. The Equal Protection Clause affords a barrier against
the patently sexist codes which abounded only a few years ago. But the
effects of that historic discrimination continue: income disparity has
been reduced somewhat in recent years, but women's earnings in the
year: 2000 are projected to be only 74 percent of men's; 136 the trend
toward the feminization of poverty continues relentlessly, although
most women, regardless of marital and family status, are employed;
there is abundant evidence that Justice O'Connor's notion of a "self-
fulfilling prophecy" was realistic, that women have so internalized
society's sex-based expectations that they do not see choices now
legally available to them. 137
The power of existing constitutional provisions to guarantee
equality has been exhausted for the foreseeable future. Only an
explicit cartnitment in the supreme law of the land to a "principle of
perfect equality" can break the ties to our discriminatory history.
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APPENDIX A
Summary of United States Supreme
Court Decisions Construing Federal Statutes
Forbidding Gender Discrimination
Equal Pay Act
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan , 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
Corning Glass continued to violate the Act even after it equalized
day (historically all female) and night (historically all male)
inspector wage rates in January of 1969. The higher: rate preserved for
employees hired before January of 1969 served to perpetuate the gender-
based wage differential between day and night shifts.
Title VII
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. , 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
Title VII prohibits different hiring policies for men who are
parents of preschool children and women who are parents of preschool
children, but "conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more
relevant to job performance for a woman than a man, could arguably be a
basis for distinction . . . ."
General Electric Company v. Gilbert , 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
A private employer's disability program covering all temporary
disabilities except pregnancy does not violate Title VII.
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans , 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
Female flight attendant whose forced resignation in 1968 violated
Title VII not entitled under Title VII to credit for pre-1968
employment on rehiring in 1972.
Dothard v. Rawlinson , 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Alabama statute establishing minimum height and weight requirements
for state prison guards found to violate Title VII because of its
discriminatory impact. Regulation excluding women from contact
positions in maximum security male facilities upheld as bfoq.
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Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty , 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
Employer's policy of denying accumulated seniority to female
employees returning from pregnancy leave found to violate Title VII,
since seniority accrued during all other disability leaves. Employer's
failure to grant sick pay for pregnancy leave is not a violation of
Title VII.
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power: v. Manhart , 435 U.S. 702
(1978).
Department's pension plan requiring women to contribute at a higher
rate than men found to violate Title VII. I/swer courts erred, however,
in ordering Department to pay back amounts overwithheld from female
employees
.
Board of Trustees v. Sweeney , 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
Court of Appeals placed too heavy a burden on the employer when it
required employer "to prove absence of discriminatory motive" to defeat
Title VII claims.
County of Washington v. Gunther , 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
The Bennett Amendment to Title VII did not limit Title VII 's reach
to those claims that could be brought under the Equal Pay Act, but only
incorporated the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into
Title VII for wage discrimination claims.
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. EEOC , 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
Under Title VII as amended in 1978 by the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, discrimination on account of pregnancy is sex discrimination, and
an employer's health insurance plan providing greater benefits to
pregnant female employees than to pregnant spouses of male employees
violates Title VII.
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. , 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
A state human rights law is preempted by ERISA only insofar as it
prohibits practices that are lawful under Title VII as amended by the
PDA. Total preemption would frustrate the goal of joint federal-state
enforcement of Title VII 's prohibition of discrimination in employment.
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Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris , 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
A deferred compensation plan offered to state employees which pays
women lower monthly retirement benefits than men who have contributed
the same amount violates Title VII.
Hishon v. King and Spalding , 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
A woman lawyer's claim that she was denied partnership in a law
firm (in which she was an associate) because of her: sex is cognizable
under Title VII.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Sexual harassment, even when it does not result in "tangible" or
"economic" loss to victims, is sex discrimination forbidden by Title
VII. Employers are not always liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors. The "voluntariness" of a complainant's compliance with
sexual advances is immaterial; courts are rather to determine whether
the advances are "unwelcome."
California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra , 93 L Ed 2d
613 (1987).
A state law requiring employers to grant employees unpaid maternity
leave of up to four: months does not conflict with the intent of Title
VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, does not require
action prohibited by Title VII, and is thus not preempted by Title VII.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County , 94 L Ed 2d 615
(1987).
An agency, pursuant to its voluntary affirmative action plan, can
use sex as one factor to be considered in hiring and promotion to
traditionally segregated job categories. The plan's goal of
"achieving," as distinct from "maintaining," gender balance is
consistent with Title VII.
Title DC
Cannon v. University of Chicago , 441 U.S. 677 (1977).
Vfcman denied admission to medical school on the basis of her sex
has private right of action under Title DC of the Education Amendment
of 1972, although private right of action is only "implied" by the
statute
.
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North Haven Board of Education v. Bell , 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
Although Title IX does not explicitly prohibit discrimination in
educational employment, HEW regulations bringing employment
discrimination within the reach of Title DC are consistent with
congressional intent.
Grove City College v. Bell , 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
Receipt by individual students at a private college of Basic
Educational Opportunity Grants directly from the Department of
Education makes the college a recipient of federal funding for purposes
of Title IX. For enforcement purposes, the "program or activity"
receiving federal funding is limited to the college's financial aid
program.
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In light of the Supreme Court's active and vital role in affording
to Black Americans constitutional protection from discrimination on account
of their race, scholars and activists alike looked to the Court for reali-
zation of Mill's "principle of perfect equality" of the sexes. Because
the Court had construed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as establish-
ing a nearly absolute barrier against racial classifications, hopes for
gender equality were focused on those constitutional provisions, on "equal
protection."
This paper documents the development of an intermediate standard
of equal protection analysis applicable to gender cases, and examines
that standard in application. The Court's decisions in gender cases are
considered in three groups: first, the relevant history of legal pater-
nalism, as evidenced in opinions from 1373 to 1961, is described; second,
decisions between 1971, when the Court first invalidated a gender classifi-
cation on equal protection grounds, and 1976, when the third level of
equal protection analysis was made explicit,, are analyzed; third, the
decisions since announcement of the third level of review are analyzed
for logic, consistency, and effect.
That "equal protection" does not have the same force when applied
to gender as when applied to race is now well-settled. The Court's
failure to treat race and gender alike was virtually compelled by the
recent failure of the Equal Rights Amendment to gain ratification. The
amendment was before — and rejected by ~ the people during the period
when the Court was being asked to apply to gender classifications the
same "strict scrutiny" that it had brought to classifications based
upon race. Adoption of that standard would ~ in light of the failure
of the Equal Rights Amendment — have amounted to judicial usurpation
of an essential power committed by the Constitution to the people, the
power to amend the Constitution.
